Does Private Country‐by‐Country Reporting Deter Tax Avoidance and Income Shifting? Evidence from BEPS Action Item 13
研究欧盟引入国别报告制度对企业税收的影响，发现受影响的跨国公司实际税率上升1-2个百分点，且2018年起利润转移行为有所减少，但整体效果有限。
ABSTRACT To combat tax avoidance by multinational corporations, the Organisation for Economic Co‐operation and Development introduced country‐by‐country reporting (CbCr), requiring firms to provide tax authorities with a geographic breakdown of their profitability and activities. Treating the introduction of CbCr in the European Union as a shock to private disclosure requirements, this study examines the effect on corporate tax outcomes. Exploiting the €750 million revenue threshold for disclosure and employing regression‐discontinuity and difference‐in‐differences designs, I document a 1–2 percentage point increase in consolidated GAAP effective tax rates among affected firms. I also find evidence consistent with a decline in tax‐motivated income shifting, starting in 2018. These results suggest that, although private geographic disclosures can deter corporate tax avoidance, so far, the regulations have had a limited effect on tax‐motivated income shifting. My findings have policy implications for the global implementation of private CbCr and extend the debate on public versus private disclosure of tax information.