Loss leading with salient thinkers
基于Varian的销售模型，研究了当消费者是突出思考者时，禁止零售商亏本销售可能反而降低产品质量和总福利。
Abstract In various countries, competition laws restrict retailers' freedom to sell their products below cost. A common rationale, shared by policymakers, consumer interest groups and brand manufacturers alike, is that such “loss leading” of products would ultimately lead to a race‐to‐the‐bottom in product quality. Building on Varian's (1980) model of sales, we provide a foundation for this critique, though only when consumers are salient thinkers, putting too much weight on certain product attributes. But we also show how a prohibition of loss leading can backfire, as it may make it even less attractive for retailers to stock high‐quality products, decreasing both aggregate welfare and consumer surplus.