A dominant strategy double clock auction with estimation‐based tâtonnement
提出一种双向时钟拍卖，在具有多维私人信息和多单位交易者的同质商品市场中，实现无赤字、事后个体理性、约束有效，并使真诚出价成为占优策略均衡，同时通过估计需求与供给达到渐近有效。
The price mechanism is fundamental to economics but difficult to reconcile with incentive compatibility and individual rationality. We introduce a double clock auction for a homogeneous good market with multidimensional private information and multiunit traders that is deficit‐free, ex post individually rational, constrained efficient, and makes sincere bidding a dominant strategy equilibrium. Under a weak dependence and an identifiability condition, our double clock auction is also asymptotically efficient. Asymptotic efficiency is achieved by estimating demand and supply using information from the bids of traders that have dropped out and following a tâtonnement process that adjusts the clock prices based on the estimates.