Public Leaderboard Feedback in Sampling Competition: An Experimental Investigation
研究了公开排行榜反馈在序贯抽样竞赛中的作用，理论表明固定截止日期下公开反馈可能减少预期抽样次数和获胜值，实验基本支持理论，并探讨了个人特征的影响。
Abstract We investigate the role of performance feedback, in the form of a public leaderboard, in a sequential-sampling contest with costly observations. We show theoretically that for contests with a fixed ending date (i.e., finite horizon), providing public performance feedback may result in fewer expected observations and a lower expected value of the winning observation. We conduct a controlled laboratory experiment to test the theoretical predictions and find that the experimental results largely support the theory. In addition, we investigate how individual characteristics affect competitive sequential-sampling activity.