Location matters: Valuing firm‐specific nonmarket risk in the global mining industry
研究利用集体行动和社会运动理论，发现靠近环境敏感水源的矿场面临更高的非市场风险，股票市场会对此类公告给予折扣，且风险受矿物类型、水源性质和东道国制度强度调节。
Abstract Research summary Using collective action and social movement theory, we investigate the potential incentives and ability of stakeholders to engage in collective action that can increase firm‐specific nonmarket risk of mining companies. We argue that proximity to the nearest environmentally sensitive water source increases the probability that local stakeholders will take collective actions that impose material costs on the focal mine. We hypothesize that stock markets recognize this nonmarket risk and apply a discount on announcements related to mines located near such areas, and that these risks are moderated by the type of mineral, the nature of the water source, and the strength of host country institutions. Using a unique data set and an event study method, we find support for most of our arguments. Managerial summary We argue that mines located near environmentally sensitive water sources are subject to nonmarket risks arising from the potential collective actions of local stakeholders and their allies. Stakeholder mobilization can impose material costs on a mine in the form of delays, regulatory hurdles, and closure. We find that stock markets recognize these nonmarket risks and apply a discount on announcements by mining companies whose mines are located near environmentally sensitive water sources, particularly rivers. However, we also find that investor reaction is stronger in countries with strong institutions that support collective action. Thus, nonmarket risk management is important even in countries that are typically characterized by low political and institutional risks. We discuss the degree to which these results can be generalized beyond mining.