Capacity Rights and Full-Cost Transfer Pricing
研究了多部门公司中全成本转移定价的理论特性，分析了不同变体如何影响部门经理在产能投资和后续产出决策中的效率，对会计和管理会计学者有参考价值。
This paper examines the theoretical properties of full-cost transfer prices in multidivisional firms. In our model, divisional managers are responsible for the initial acquisition of productive capacity and the utilization of that capacity in subsequent periods, once operational uncertainty has been resolved. We examine alternative variants of full-cost transfer pricing with the property that the discounted sum of transfer payments is equal to the initial capacity acquisition cost and the present value of all subsequent variable costs of output supplied to a division. Our analysis identifies environments where particular variants of full-cost transfer pricing induce efficiency in both the initial investments and the subsequent output levels. Our findings highlight the need for a proper integration of intracompany pricing rules and divisional control rights over capacity assets. This paper was accepted by Suraj Srinivasan, accounting.