Uninsured Unemployment Risk and Optimal Monetary Policy in a Zero-Liquidity Economy
研究了在价格粘性经济中，家庭因未保险的失业风险而进行预防性储蓄，导致总需求下降和失业风险上升的通货紧缩螺旋，并发现最优货币政策应比完全保险情形更宽松，以打破这一螺旋。
I study optimal monetary policy in a sticky-price economy wherein households precautionary-save against uninsured, endogenous unemployment risk. In this economy greater unemployment risk raises desired savings, causing aggregate demand to fall and feed back to greater unemployment risk. This deflationary spiral is constrained inefficient and calls for an accommodative monetary policy response: after a contractionary aggregate shock the policy rate should be kept significantly lower and for longer than in the perfect-insurance benchmark. For example, the usual prescription obtained under perfect insurance of a hike in the policy rate in the face of a bad supply (i.e., productivity or cost-push) shock is easily overturned. The optimal policy breaks the deflationary spiral and takes the dynamics of the imperfect-insurance economy close to that of the perfect-insurance benchmark. These results are derived in an economy with zero asset supply (zero liquidity) and are thus independent of any redistributive effect of monetary policy on household wealth.