Strategy-proof multi-object mechanism design: Ex-post revenue maximization with non-quasilinear preferences
研究卖家在非拟线性偏好下销售多物品时，最小瓦尔拉斯均衡价格机制在满足防策略性等条件下能最大化收益，对机制设计者和拍卖理论研究者有参考价值。
A seller is selling multiple objects to a set of agents, who can buy at most one object. Each agent's preference over (object, payment) pairs need not be quasilinear. The seller considers the following desiderata for her mechanism, which she terms desirable: (1) strategy-proofness, (2) ex-post individual rationality, (3) equal treatment of equals, (4) no wastage (every object is allocated to some agent). The minimum Walrasian equilibrium price (MWEP) mechanism is desirable. We show that at each preference profile, the MWEP mechanism generates more revenue for the seller than any desirable mechanism satisfying no subsidy. Our result works for the quasilinear domain, where the MWEP mechanism is the VCG mechanism, and for various non-quasilinear domains, some of which incorporate positive income effect of agents. We can relax no subsidy to no bankruptcy in our result for certain domains with positive income effect.