Optimal Financing Models Offered by Manufacturers with Risk Aversion and Market Competition Considerations
研究了制造商在风险规避和资本市场竞争下如何选择贸易信贷、零售商独立融资和部分信用担保等融资模式，并提出了风险态度测量方法和协调机制。
ABSTRACT Trade credit finance (TCF), retailer independent finance (RIF), and partial credit guarantee (PCG) finance are all important financing tools for capital‐constrained retailers. Risk aversion has a significant impact on financing, but it is difficult to measure. This research investigates the manufacturer's financing provision strategies considering risk aversion and capital market competition. First, an ordinary least squares method with conditional value at risk criteria is proposed to measure the risk attitude of decision‐makers. Second, the equilibrium mode of financing provision and impacts of risk aversion and the retailer's initial capital are analyzed. Third, a laboratory experiment and numerical analysis are conducted to verify the risk aversion estimation method and other theoretical results. We draw the following conclusions. First, the equilibrium financing provision mode changes with the degree of risk aversion and retailer's initial capital. Although the manufacturer prefers TCF and PCG to RIF, the retailer chooses the RIF mode when its initial capital is low. A variable parameter guarantee mechanism is proposed to encourage more retailers to choose PCG instead of RIF. Second, the risk‐averse financing system realizes super‐centralization (i.e., utility in the decentralized system is larger than that in the centralized system) when the manufacturer is less risk averse than the other participants. A Pareto‐optimality mechanism is designed to realize super‐centralization and coordinate the decentralized financing system. This research provides financing providers with practical guidance on the efficient implementation of supply chain financing.