The Dynamic Electoral Returns of a Large Antipoverty Program
研究印度大型反贫困计划持续时间对选举结果的影响，发现更长的计划暴露会降低政府对选民的支持，可能原因是选民对实施质量问责。
Abstract Governments around the world use short-term reelection strategies. This is problematic if governments can maximize their reelection chances by prioritizing short-term spending before an election over long-term reforms. This paper tests whether longer program exposure has a causal effect on election outcomes in the context of a large antipoverty program in India. Using a regression-discontinuity framework, the results show that length of program exposure lowers electoral support for the government. The paper discusses a couple of potential explanations, finding that the most plausible mechanism is that voters hold the government accountable for the program's implementation quality.