Prestige, Promotion, and Pay
研究了金融等专业服务公司如何通过设计职业结构来“出售”有声望的职位，初级员工竞争更高级别职位，模型揭示了声望与薪酬、就业、竞争及金融部门规模的关系。
ABSTRACT We develop a theory in which financial (and other professional services) firms design career structures to “sell” prestigious jobs to qualified candidates. Firms create less prestigious entry‐level jobs, which serve as currency for employees to pay for the right to compete for the more prestigious jobs. In optimal career structures, entry‐level employees (“associates”) compete for better‐paid and more prestigious positions (“managing directors” or “partners”). The model provides new implications relating job prestige to compensation, employment, competition, and the size of the financial sector.