Discerning Solution Concepts for Discrete Games
研究了如何从观测到的玩家行为和协变量数据中，判断离散完全信息博弈的数据是由哪种解概念（如纳什均衡、理性化行为等）生成的，这对政策评估和反事实分析至关重要。
The empirical analysis of discrete complete-information games has relied on behavioral restrictions in the form of solution concepts, such as Nash equilibrium. Choosing the right solution concept is crucial not just for the identification of payoff parameters, but also for the validity and informativeness of counterfactual exercises and policy implications. We say that a solution concept is discernible if it is possible to determine whether it generated the observed data on the players’ behavior and covariates. We propose a set of conditions that make it possible to discern solution concepts. In particular, our conditions are sufficient to tell whether the players’ choices emerged from Nash equilibria. We can also discriminate between rationalizable behavior, maxmin behavior, and collusive behavior. Finally, we identify the correlation structure of unobserved shocks in our model using a novel approach.