Application and Award Responses to Stricter Screening in Disability Insurance
研究了荷兰残疾保险改革中更严格筛查对申请率和奖励结果的影响，发现申请率大幅下降，尤其对难以验证的疾病和较轻健康问题者，且被阻止申请者健康状况更差、工作更少。
We examine the targeting effects of stricter screening in the Dutch Disability Insurance (DI) program induced by a nationwide reform. The drastic “Gatekeeper Protocol” increased application costs and revealed more information about individuals’ ability to work. Discontinuity-in-Time regressions on administrative data show substantial declines in DI application rates (40% in one year) following the reform, particularly among difficult-to-verify impairments and less severe health disorders. Individuals that were deterred from applying had worse health and worked less than never-applicants. Changes in average health conditions of awardees were almost fully driven by selfscreening and work resumption during the DI sick-pay period.