Fishing for fools
研究发现市场机制会放大行为偏差对价格的影响，拍卖比固定价格市场更高效地筛选出高估偏差的买家，卖家因此选择利润更高但效率较低的销售方式。
We show that common market settings tend to amplify rather than reduce the effect of behavioral biases on prices and other market outcomes. We study two common market mechanisms, auctions and fixed-price markets, and establish three results. First, agents with upward-biased valuations have an amplified effect on market outcomes because markets over-select them relative to their population share. Intuitively, markets “fish for fools.” Second, auctions are often more efficient at “fishing” than fixed-price markets because a larger share of biased agents is required for prices to move in the fixed-price setting. Third, sellers respond to this difference and choose the less efficient but more profitable selling mechanism. They may also engage in inefficient complementary actions such as overproducing the good and over-recruiting buyers. We provide evidence from several markets, including eBay, housing markets, and financial markets.