Screening by mode of trade
研究了垄断者在非匿名耐用品市场中，通过短期承诺合同选择销售或租赁，发现当未来交易有摩擦且垄断者比消费者更有耐心时，最优菜单通过向高类型销售、低类型租赁来筛选消费者，从而降低信息租金和配置成本。
This paper endogenizes a monopolist's choice between selling and renting in a non-anonymous durable goods setting with short-term commitment, by allowing for contracts that determine the good's allocation not only at the beginning but also at the end of a given period. We show that the revenue-maximizing menu of contracts features screening by mode of trade when future trade is subject to frictions and the monopolist is more patient than consumers. Selling to high types while renting to low types, allows the monopolist to defer part of his compensation in form of a reduction of consumers' future information rents while lowering the allocational costs of ordinary, intertemporal screening.