Real‐Time Pricing and Imperfect Competition in Electricity Markets*
研究了发电企业拥有市场势力时采用实时电价的影响，发现实时电价降低高峰电价、提高非高峰电价，增加消费者剩余和福利，减少行业利润，且市场势力会放大这些效应。
We analyze the effects of the adoption of real‐time pricing (RTP) of electricity when generating firms have market power. We find that an increase in consumers on RTP contracts decreases peak prices and increases off‐peak prices, increases consumer surplus (both for switching and non‐switching consumers) and welfare, while decreasing industry profits, with these effects being magnified by the extent of market power. We illustrate these results by calibrating our model to the New Zealand electricity market, and find that taking into account the market power of generating firms increases the efficiency gains from RTP adoption by 41%.