Do the Burdens to Being Public Affect the Investment and Innovation of Newly Public Firms?
利用JOBS法案消除部分新上市公司的披露、审计和治理要求，发现减轻上市负担的公司上市后投资更多且更高效，尤其在创新投资方面，表明上市负担加剧代理问题，抑制经理人承担风险项目。
We examine how regulatory burdens affect the investment and innovation of newly public firms. To do so, we exploit the Jumpstart Our Business Startups (JOBS) Act, which eliminates certain disclosure, auditing, and governance requirements for a subset of newly public firms. Firms treated with these reduced burdens invest more and more efficiently after going public relative to untreated firms. These findings are concentrated in innovative investments and are nonexistent in dual-class firms. Overall, our findings suggest that the burdens to being public exacerbate agency frictions, which lead managers to take on fewer risky projects. This paper was accepted by Suraj Srinivasan, accounting.