Optimal Timing of Policy Announcements in Dynamic Election Campaigns*
构建了一个动态竞选模型，研究候选人在竞选过程中有限且随机出现的政策澄清机会如何影响其策略，发现均衡状态下候选人会长时间使用模糊语言。
Abstract We construct a dynamic model of election campaigns. In the model, opportunities for candidates to refine/clarify their policy positions are limited and arrive stochastically along the course of the campaign until the predetermined election date. We show that this simple friction leads to rich and subtle campaign dynamics. We first demonstrate these effects in a series of canonical static models of elections that we extend to dynamic settings, including models with valence and a multidimensional policy space. We then present general principles that underlie the results from those models. In particular, we establish that candidates spend a long time using ambiguous language during the election campaign in equilibrium.