Liquidity Insurance with Market Information
研究股票价格等市场信号如何缓解信贷和流动性管理中的信息不对称问题，发现债权人通过将流动性保险与事后价格信号挂钩，能激励借款人说实话，但价格与流动性供给的双向反馈可能产生多重均衡。
Abstract This paper studies how market signals—such as stock prices—can help alleviate the severity of the asymmetric information problem in credit and liquidity management. Asymmetric information hinders the ability of borrowers (firms, investment banks, etc.) to undertake profitable investment opportunities and to insure themselves against liquidity shocks. I show that on the equilibrium path creditors do not learn anything from market signals because they can use a menu of contracts to screen the different types of borrowers. However, by conditioning liquidity insurance on ex post price signals, creditors are able to provide the borrowers with better incentives for truth telling. At the same time, prices depend on the liquidity that creditors offer to the borrowers. This two-way feedback impacts the design of the optimal contract and potentially generates multiple equilibria in financial markets.