The Long-Term Costs of Government Surveillance: Insights from Stasi Spying in East Germany
利用东德斯塔西间谍密度的地区差异，研究发现监控密度越高，两德统一后的人际信任和制度信任越低，收入更低、失业风险更高、自主创业更少。
ABSTRACT We investigate the long-run effects of government surveillance on civic capital and economic performance, studying the case of the Stasi in East Germany. Exploiting regional variation in the number of spies and administrative features of the system, we combine a border discontinuity design with an instrumental variable strategy to estimate the long-term, post-reunification effect of government surveillance. We find that a higher spying density led to persistently lower levels of interpersonal and institutional trust in post-reunification Germany. We also find substantial and long-lasting economic effects of Stasi surveillance, resulting in lower income, higher exposure to unemployment, and lower self-employment.