Investment and Union Certification
利用工会认证选举数据，估计工会化对企业投资行为的影响，发现工会认证显著减少选举后一年的投资，其效果相当于公司税提高33个百分点。
Using data on union certification elections, the authors estimate the impact of unionization on firms' investment behavior. Employing both a standard q model and an 'investment surprises' technique, they find that union certification significantly reduces investment in the year following the election. The authors find that a winning certification election has, on average, about the same effect on investment in the year following the event as would--given the elasticity measures taken from the public finance literature--a 33 percentage-point increase in the corporate tax. The magnitude of the response in years further away from the election is less certain. Copyright 1999 by University of Chicago Press.