Employment Contracts, Influence Activities, and Efficient Organization Design
当更换工作成本高时，高效雇佣合同通常无法补偿员工受后续事件和决策的影响，导致员工浪费时间去影响管理者的决策。高效组织设计通过限制决策者的自由裁量权来应对这一倾向。
Efficient employment contracts usually fail to compensate workers for the effects of posthir ing events and decisions when changing jobs is costly. Then, when the re are executives and managers with authority to make discretionary decisions, affected employees will be led to waste valuable time tryi ng to influence their decisions. Efficient organization design coun-t ers this tendency by limiting the discretion of decision makers, espe cially for those decisions that have large distributional consequence s but that are otherwise of little consequence to the organization. Copyright 1988 by University of Chicago Press.