Satisfaction Guaranteed: When Moral Hazard Meets Moral Preferences
研究在互联网交易中，提供“满意保证”并辅以轻微法律或声誉约束，能否让偏好诚实的交易者战胜道德风险，恢复有利可图的交易。
The fear of moral hazard—especially in the age of internet commerce—can depress or prevent profitable trades. Experiments show, however, that many people prefer honesty to deceit and would not succumb to moral hazard. This paper asks whether we can find a simple, voluntary institution that can empower moral traders, drive out amoral ones, reduce moral hazard, and restore profitable trade to markets. I find that selling goods with a “satisfaction guarantee,” accompanied by potentially minor legal or reputational enforcement, allows moral preferences to defeat moral hazard.