The Control of Politicians in Divided Societies: The Politics of Fear
建立模型说明，在缺乏制度化权力交接的族群分裂社会中，统治者如何利用民众对敌对族群统治的恐惧来维持支持，即使其政策低效且腐败，模型预测了庇护主义、族群偏袒和资源掠夺，与后殖民非洲的治理困境一致。
Autocrats in many developing countries have extracted enormous personal rents from power. In addition, they have imposed inefficient policies including pervasive patronage spending. I present a model in which the presence of ethnic identities and the absence of institutionalized succession processes allow the ruler to elicit support from a sizeable share of the population despite large reductions in welfare. The fear of falling under an equally inefficient and venal ruler that favours another group is enough to discipline supporters. The model predicts extensive use of patronage, ethnic bias in taxation, and spending patterns and unveils a new mechanism through which economic frictions translate into increased rent extraction by the leader. These predictions are consistent with the experiences of bad governance, ethnic bias, wasteful policies, and kleptocracy in post-colonial Africa. Copyright 2007, Wiley-Blackwell.