Complementarity of Performance Pay and Task Allocation
利用全国代表性企业数据，检验绩效薪酬与决策权下放之间的互补性，发现绩效薪酬促使决策权从非管理人员向管理人员集中，而非全面下放。
Complementarity between performance pay and other organizational design elements has been argued to be one potential explanation for stark differences in the observed productivity gains from performance pay adoption. Using detailed data on internal organization for a nationally representative sample of firms, we empirically test for the existence of complementarity between performance pay incentives and decentralization of decision-making authority for tasks. To address endogeneity concerns, we exploit regional variation in income tax progressivity as an instrument for the adoption of performance pay. We find systematic evidence of complementarity between performance pay and decentralization of decision making from principals to employees. However, adopting performance pay also leads to centralization of decision-making authority from nonmanagerial to managerial employees. The findings suggest that performance pay adoption leads to a concentration of decision-making control at the managerial employee level, as opposed to a general movement toward more decentralization throughout the organization. This paper was accepted by Bruno Cassiman, business strategy.