Knowing What Others Know: Coordination Motives in Information Acquisition
研究在战略互补性博弈中，信息选择如何产生互补性，导致异质信念难以维持并可能产生多重均衡；在替代性博弈中，代理人倾向于差异化信息选择。这些结果用于分析价格设定模型并确保均衡唯一性。
We explore how optimal information choices change the predictions of strategic models. When a large number of agents play a game with strategic complementarity, information choices exhibit complementarity as well: if an agent wants to do what others do, they want to know what others know. This makes heterogeneous beliefs difficult to sustain and may generate multiple equilibria. In models with substitutability, agents prefer to differentiate their information choices. We use these theoretical results to examine the role of information choice in recent price-setting models and to propose modelling techniques that ensure equilibrium uniqueness.