Take What You Can: Property Rights, Contestability and Conflict*
利用巴西亚马逊地区土地产权可争夺性的时空差异，研究发现解决土地产权可争夺性可消除当地几乎所有与土地相关的暴力冲突，但可能增加其他地区的冲突。
Weak property rights are strongly associated with underdevelopment, low state capacity and civil conflict. In economic models of conflict, outbreaks of violence require a prize that is both valuable and contestable. This paper exploits spatial and temporal variation in the availability of land with title that is contestable by private actors, to explore the relationship between (in)secure property rights and civil conflict in the Brazilian Amazon. The results suggest that resolving this contestability of title at the local level could eliminate substantively all local land-related violence but might increase conflict in areas where title remained contestable.