An empirical investigation of the welfare effects of banning wholesale price discrimination
利用德国咖啡零售数据估计供需模型，模拟禁止批发价格歧视的福利效应，发现该政策在市场中带来正向福利，且下游成本差异或竞争程度会影响效果。
Economic theory does not provide sharp predictions on the welfare effects of banning wholesale price discrimination: if downstream cost differences exist, then discrimination shifts production inefficiently, toward high‐cost retailers, so a ban increases welfare; if differences in price elasticity of demand across retailers exist, discrimination may increase welfare if quantity sold increases, so a ban reduces welfare. Using retail prices and quantities of coffee brands sold by German retailers, I estimate a model of demand and supply and separate cost and demand differences. Simulating a ban on wholesale price discrimination has positive welfare effects in this market, and less if downstream cost differences shrink, or with less competition.