The Effects of Competition in Consumer Credit Markets
研究发现银行和非银行机构在消费信贷市场竞争加剧时反应不同：银行转向关系型贷款并提高盈利，而非银行则向高风险借款人扩张信贷，导致违约率上升。
Abstract This paper finds that banks and nonbanks respond differently to increased competition in consumer credit markets. Increased competition and a greater threat of failure induces banks to specialize in relationship business lending, and surviving banks are more profitable. However, nonbanks change their credit policy when faced with more competition and expand credit to riskier borrowers at the extensive margin, resulting in higher default rates. These results show how the effects of competition depend on the form of intermediation. They also suggest that increased competition can cause credit risk to migrate outside the traditional supervisory umbrella.