The Effects of Product Market Competition on Collective Bargaining Agreements: The Case of Foreign Competition in Canada
利用加拿大1965-1983年集体谈判协议数据，研究外国竞争冲击如何影响工资谈判和工会就业，发现每1%的工人人均增加值变化会使谈判工资变动0.25%，每1%的企业销售额变化会使就业变动0.19%。
In this paper we study the connections between product .market conditions. negotiated wage settlements. and union employment in the presence of foreign competition shocks. We exploit the fact that in a small open economy such as Canada the price of imports and exports should represent pure demand shocks. We specify wage and employment determination equations for a sample of collective bargaining agreements from 1965 to 1983. Our estimation strategy consists of specifying the wage as a function of firm-specific value added per worker instrumented with the price of imports and the price of exports in the industry. The OLS specification is rejected in favor of the instrumental variables specification using standard specification tests. The instrumental variables estimates imply that a 1% change in value-added per worker increases the negotiated wage settlements by 0.25%. Similarly, we specify union employment as a function of firm-specific sales instrumented by the price of imports and exports in the industry. The instrumental variables estimates are imprecise and the specification test fails to reject the OLS specification. The OLS estimates imply that a 1% change in firm-specific sales increases employment by 0.19%. We use our estimates to trace the effects of foreign competition on the industry and firm-level sales and value-added measures.