A Model of Complex Contracts
研究了一个委托人和有限理性代理人之间的机制设计问题，代理人每次只能处理K条信息。委托人通过将机制表达为复杂合同（一系列条款，每条只提供有限信息）来操纵代理人相信如实报告是最优的。结果表明有限理性扩大了可实施函数的集合，且最优合同对K的变化以及代理人认知过程的几种合理变化具有稳健性。
I study a mechanism design problem involving a principal and a single, boundedly rational agent. The agent transitions among belief states by combining current beliefs with up to K pieces of information at a time. By expressing a mechanism as a complex contract—a collection of clauses, each providing limited information about the mechanism—the principal manipulates the agent into believing truthful reporting is optimal. I show that such bounded rationality expands the set of implementable functions and that optimal contracts are robust not only to variation in K, but to several plausible variations on the agent’s cognitive procedure.