Incomplete Environmental Regulation, Imperfect Competition, and Emissions Leakage
研究了在不完全规制和不完全竞争行业中，排放泄漏如何发生，并以加州电力部门为例模拟发现，豁免州外生产者的规制仅能实现完全规制下约三分之一的减排量，且每吨成本翻倍。
Environmental regulation of industrial pollution is often incomplete; regulations apply to only a subset of facilities contributing to a pollution problem. Policymakers are increasingly concerned about the emissions leakage that may occur if unregulated production can be easily substituted for regulated production. This paper analyzes emissions leakage in an incompletely regulated and imperfectly competitive industry. The analytical model is used to simulate outcomes under incomplete, market-based regulation of carbon dioxide emissions in California's electricity sector. Regulation that exempts out-of-state producers achieves approximately one-third of the total emissions reductions achieved under complete regulation at more than twice the cost per ton.