Optimal Taxation of Top Labor Incomes: A Tale of Three Elasticities
推导了顶层收入者的最优税率公式，考虑劳动供给、避税和薪酬谈判三种反应渠道，发现存在零和薪酬谈判效应时最优税率应提高。实证表明减税与顶层收入份额上升相关，但未促进经济增长，且CEO“为运气付费”现象在低税率时更普遍。
This paper derives optimal top tax rate formulas in a model where top earners respond to taxes through three channels: labor supply, tax avoidance, and compensation bargaining. The optimal top tax rate increases when there are zero-sum compensation-bargaining effects. We present empirical evidence consistent with bargaining effects. Top tax rate cuts are associated with top one percent pretax income shares increases but not higher economic growth. US CEO “pay for luck” is quantitatively more prevalent when top tax rates are low. International CEO pay levels are negatively correlated with top tax rates, even controlling for firms' characteristics and performance.