Firm Performance: Do Non‐Executive Directors Have Minds of their Own? Evidence from UK Panel Data
利用英国公司1991-2001年面板数据，用GMM方法控制内生性，发现非执行董事比例与公司绩效正相关，而非执行董事持股比例则无显著影响，表明只有非执行董事是有效的监督者。
I investigate the relation between firm performance and both ownership structure and board composition. Use of the GMM methodology permits simultaneous control of both endogeneity of the independent variables and fixed effects. The data comprise an original, large, hand‐collected panel dataset of UK firms for the period 1991–2001. Results indicate that the direction of causality runs from ownership and board composition to performance. I find a cubic relation between performance and ownership by executive directors. The proportion of non‐executives on the board, but not their proportional ownership, is significantly and positively related to firm performance. Finally, the relation between performance and blockholdings by institutional and non‐institutional owners is negative. Thus, results indicate that only non‐executive directors are effective monitors.