Incentives That (Could Have) Saved Lives: Government Regulation of Accident Insurance Associations in Germany, 1884–1914
研究了1884年德国强制工业意外保险制度因激励设计缺陷未能降低事故率，而政府加强安全规则后通过计量分析表明更一致执行本可更早更广泛减少事故。
Germany introduced compulsory industrial accident insurance in 1884. The accident-insurance system compensated injured workers and survivors for losses, but initially failed to limit the growth of accident rates. We trace this failure to the 1884 law's faulty incentives and to an initial unwillingness to use the tools built into the law. The government regulator increasingly stressed rules that forced firms to adopt specific safety-enhancing innovations and practices. Econometric analysis shows that more consistent use of the rules and the limited incentives available under the law would have reduced industrial accidents earlier and more extensively.