Optimal Taxation when Consumers Have Endogenous Benchmark Levels of Consumption
研究消费者效用取决于自身消费与他人消费基准水平时，代际交叠经济中的最优税收，发现通过现收现付社会保障和资本所得税可实现社会最优。
I examine optimal taxes in an overlapping generations economy in which each consumer's utility depends on consumption relative to a weighted average of consumption by others (the benchmark level of consumption) as well as on the level of the consumer's own consumption. The socially optimal balanced growth path is characterized by the Modified Golden Rule and by a condition on the intergenerational allocation of consumption in each period. A competitive economy can be induced to attain the social optimum by a lump-sum pay-as-you-go social security system and a tax on capital income. Copyright 2005, Wiley-Blackwell.