Axiomatic Equilibrium Selection for Generic Two-Player Games
针对有限完美回忆博弈，提出一组公理条件，证明在两人一般支付博弈中，满足这些条件的解集必为使用未支配策略的均衡的实质连通分支，即Mertens稳定集。
For a finite game with perfect recall, a refinement of its set of Nash equilibria selects closed connected subsets, called solutions. Assume that each solution's equilibria use undominated strategies and some of its equilibria are quasi-perfect, and that all solutions are immune to presentation effects; namely, if the game is embedded in a larger game with more pure strategies and more players such that the original players' feasible mixed strategies and expected payoffs are preserved regardless of what other players do, then the larger game's solutions project to the original game's solutions. Then, for a game with two players and generic payoffs, each solution is an essential component of the set of equilibria that use undominated strategies, and thus a stable set of equilibria as defined by Mertens (1989).