Private Money and Reserve Management in a Random‐Matching Model
构建了一个包含持有准备金的银行的货币模型，在随机匹配框架下允许私人负债作为交换媒介流通，并分析了银行券赎回如何稳定银行部门的货币发行。
In this paper, we develop a model of money and reserve‐holding banks. We allow for private liabilities to circulate as media of exchange in a random‐matching framework. Some individuals, which we identify as banks, are endowed with a technology to issue private notes and to keep reserves with a clearinghouse. Bank liabilities are redeemed according to a stochastic process that depends on the endogenous trades. We find conditions under which note redemptions act as a force that is sufficient to stabilize note issue by the banking sector.