委员会决策:透明度、声誉与投票规则

Decision Making in Committees: Transparency, Reputation, and Voting Rules

American Economic Review · 2007
被引 11
人大 A+FT50ABS 4*

中文导读

分析委员会决策过程的透明度如何影响最终决策,发现秘密投票会强化成员对现有偏见的遵从,而透明投票则更可能推动改革,但结合适当投票规则时秘密程序也可能产生更优决策。

Abstract

In this paper I analyze the e¤ect of the transparency of the decision making process in committees on the decisions that are eventually taken.I focus on committees whose members are motivated by career concerns, so that each member tries to enhance his own reputation.When the decision making process is secretive, the individual votes of the committee members are not exposed to the public but only the …nal decision.Thus, individuals are evaluated according to the group's decision.I …nd that in such a case, group members are induced to comply with preexisting biases.For example, if the voting rule demands a supermajority to accept a reform, individuals vote more often against reforms and exacerbate the conservatism of the voting rule.When the decision making process becomes transparent and individual votes are observed, this e¤ect disappears and such committees are then more likely to accept reforms.I also …nd that coupled with the right voting rule, a secretive procedure may induce better decisions than a transparent one.

委员会透明度声誉激励投票规则决策保守性