BOARD STRUCTURE, ANTITAKEOVER PROVISIONS, AND STOCKHOLDER WEALTH
研究了1984-88年间261家公司采用486项反收购条款时，市场负面反应如何因董事会结构而异：CEO与董事长分离减轻负面效应，而外部董事比例增加则加剧负面反应。
This paper’s regression analyses from a sample of 261 firms that adopted 486 antitakeover provisions (supermajority, classified boards, fair-price, reduction in cumulative voting, anti-greenmail and poison pills) in the 1984–88 period indicate that the negative market reactions to antitakeover provisions vary depending on firms’ board structures. This paper’s empirical evidence indicates that while separating the positions of CEO and chairperson of the board reduces the negative effect, increased outsider representation increases negative market reactions. © 1997 by John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.