Horizontal and Vertical Conflict: Experimental Evidence
通过实验室实验，研究了公民偏好异质性（横向冲突）与代理人寻租（纵向冲突）之间的关系，发现横向冲突越激烈，政治租金越高，这有助于解释不平等社会中的腐败持续现象。
Summary We experimentally explore the connections between horizontal conflict of interests (citizens have heterogeneous preferences over collective decisions) and vertical conflict of interests (agents in charge of implementing collective decisions earn political rents). We identify two sets of models that incorporate both types of conflicts: electoral models with endogenous rents, and common‐agency models. We adapt these models to a laboratory setting and test their main theoretical predictions. In both cases we find support for the proposition that more intense horizontal conflict leads to higher rents. Our findings have important implications. At the macro level, they help explaining the persistence of corruption in very unequal societies. At the micro level, our findings suggest that anti‐corruption programs should allocate more resources (e.g., inspectors and auditors) to areas with intense horizontal conflicts.