Optimal Taxation and Human Capital Policies over the Life Cycle
在生命周期模型中推导了存在风险人力资本时的最优所得税和人力资本政策，发现最优补贴随年龄下降，且全额扣除费用接近最优。
This paper derives optimal income tax and human capital policies in a life cycle model with risky human capital. The government faces asymmetric information regarding agents' ability, its evolution, and labor supply. When the wage elasticity with respect to ability is increasing in human capital, the optimal subsidy involves less than full deductibility of human capital expenses on the tax base and falls with age. Income-contingent loans or a deferred deductibility scheme can implement the optimum. Numerical results suggest that full deductibility of expenses is close to optimal and that simple linear age-dependent policies perform very well.