Standing on the Shoulders of Giants: The Effect of Passive Investors on Activism
研究发现被动投资者持股比例越高，积极投资者越可能寻求董事会席位，并更频繁使用代理权争夺和和解，从而提升公司价值。
Abstract We analyze whether the growing importance of passive investors has influenced the campaigns, tactics, and successes of activists. We find activists are more likely to seek board representation when a larger share of the target company’s stock is held by passively managed mutual funds. Furthermore, higher passive ownership is associated with increased use of proxy fights, settlements, and a higher likelihood the activist achieves board representation or the sale of the targeted company. Our findings suggest that the recent growth of passive institutional investors mitigates free-rider problems and facilitates activists’ ability to engage in costly, value-enhancing forms of monitoring. Received September 28, 2016; editorial decision August 18, 2018 by Editor Andrew Karolyi.