Optimal Selling Mechanism, Auction Discounts and Time on Market
研究了房地产市场中卖家在设定保留价等待随机时间与选择拍卖等待固定时间之间的最优决策，发现风险厌恶程度高的卖家更倾向拍卖，而风险厌恶程度低的卖家则选择保留价机制。
This article examines the optimal selling mechanism problem in real estate market using mean‐variance analysis and downside risk analysis. When sellers can choose between accepting the first offer above a reservation price or auctions (waiting an optimal and fixed time), sellers having higher risk aversion choose auctions and wait a fixed time while sellers having lower risk aversion choose an optimal reservation price and wait a random time. Positive auction discounts are compensated by reduced risks, and there exists a connection between liquidity risk and conditional auction discount. More (Fewer) sellers will choose to sell their houses through auctions in a hot (cold) market or when holding cost increases (decreases). When sellers choose auctions, sellers having higher risk aversion who have lower holding cost wait longer and obtain higher sale price. Loss‐averse sellers unanimously choose the mechanism of setting an optimal reservation price.