Right on Schedule: CEO Option Grants and Opportunism
研究发现，在期权授予排期制度下，CEO有动机在授予前压低股价以获取更低的行权价，并通过操纵信息披露等方式实现，这带来了负的异常回报和正的后续回报。
After the public outcry over backdating, many firms began scheduling option grants. This eliminates backdating but creates other agency problems: Chief executive officers (CEOs) aware of upcoming option grants have an incentive to temporarily depress stock prices to obtain lower strike prices. We show that some CEOs have manipulated stock prices to increase option compensation, documenting negative abnormal returns before scheduled option grants and positive abnormal returns afterward. These returns are explained by measures of CEOs’ incentives and ability to influence stock prices. We document several mechanisms used to lower stock price, including changing the substance and timing of disclosures.