Electoral Rules and Political Selection: Theory and Evidence from a Field Experiment in Afghanistan
研究选举规则（如选区规模）如何影响选民在能力与政策偏好之间的权衡，通过阿富汗实地实验发现多成员选区选出的代表教育水平更高、政策立场更温和。
Voters commonly face a choice between competent candidates and those with policy preferences similar to their own. This article explores how electoral rules, such as district magnitude, mediate this trade-off and affect the composition of representative bodies and the quality of policy outcomes. We show formally that anticipation of bargaining over policy causes voters in elections with multiple single-member districts to prefer candidates with polarized policy positions over more competent candidates. Results from a unique field experiment in Afghanistan are consistent with these predictions. Specifically, representatives selected by elections with a single multi-member district are better educated and exhibit less extreme policy preferences.