Financial Markets, Industry Dynamics and Growth
将公司治理摩擦引入内生市场结构增长模型，发现缓解治理改革虽促进企业进入，但市场结构分散后现有企业减少产品改进投资，校准美国数据表明此类改革可能导致福利损失。
Abstract This article introduces corporate governance frictions into a growth model with endogenous market structure. Managers engage in corporate resource diversion and empire building. Shareholders discipline managers with incentive compensation contracts. A reform that mitigates corporate governance frictions boosts firms’ entry and, for a given market structure, has an ambiguous impact on incumbents’ return to product improvement. However, as the market structure adjusts, becoming more diffuse, incumbents invest less in product improvement. Calibrating the model to U.S. data, we find that a reform of the kind recently enacted in several advanced economies can lead to a welfare loss.