Publicising Malfeasance: When the Local Media Structure Facilitates Electoral Accountability in Mexico
研究墨西哥地方媒体如何通过报道政府渎职行为影响选民惩罚或奖励，发现每增加一家地方媒体可使高渎职市长的选票惩罚提高1个百分点，且非本地竞争者少、受众本地化时效果更强。
Abstract Malfeasance in local governments is common in developing democracies. Electoral accountability could mitigate such malfeasance, but may require media market structures that incentivise profit-maximising local media to report on incumbent malfeasance. We test this claim in Mexico, leveraging plausibly exogenous variation in the pre-election release of municipal audits revealing misallocated spending and access to broadcast media. We find that each additional local media station amplifies voter punishment (rewards) of high (zero) malfeasance by up to 1 percentage point. Local media’s accountability-enhancing effects are greater when there are fewer non-local competitors and where local outlets’ audiences principally reside within their municipality.