Mental Accounting, Access Motives, and Overinsurance*
提出获取动机是保险价值的重要来源，并论证心理账户使该动机有助于理解保修受欢迎和免赔额被回避的现象，解释了现有模型难以调和的实证规律。
Abstract The access motive for insurance posits that insurance derives its value from providing access to a loss remedy that is unaffordable without insurance. I explore the potential of this alternative insurance motive to explain attitudes towards modest risks, and I argue that mental accounting makes the access motive relevant for understanding both the popularity of warranties and the avoidance of deductibles. The value of partial insurance is shown to critically depend on the way in which the insurer pays benefits. This can explain several empirical regularities that are difficult to reconcile within existing models.