Are Generalists Beneficial to Corporate Shareholders? Evidence from Exogenous Executive Turnovers
利用164例CEO突然死亡和345例外生更替事件，研究发现通才型CEO能提升股东价值，且离职CEO的通才指数越高，更替公告时的异常股票回报越低。
This study finds a positive, economically meaningful impact of generalist chief executive officers (CEOs) on shareholder value using 164 sudden deaths and 345 non-sudden exogenous turnovers. The higher a departing CEO’s general ability index (GAI), independently and relative to her successor, the lower is the abnormal stock return to turnover announcements. Returns reflect post-turnover changes in operating performance. Further, CEOs’ and successors’ GAIs are significantly positively related, but only for non-sudden turnovers. Consistently, for sudden deaths, we find positive stock returns to appointments of generalist successors. The results provide a market-based explanation for the generalist pay premium.